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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FIFTH AMENDMENT-TAKINGS-REGULA-
TORY TAKINGS-The United States Supreme Court held that in
order to survive a takings challenge, a development exaction
must have an essential nexus with a legitimate state interest,
and also that a rough proportionality must exist between the
development exaction and the burdens to be imposed by the
proposed development.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
Florence Dolan' ("Dolan") owned a plumbing and electric re-
tail store in Tigard, Oregon (the "City")? as well as a 1.67 acre
(71,500 square foot) plot of land at the location of the store.3
Dolan's land was zoned as part of the City's Central Business
District.4 Dolan's existing store was housed in a 9,700 square
foot building which was located on the eastern side of the plot.5
Fanno Creek borders Dolan's property to the west, and part of
her property lies within the creek's hundred-year floodplain.6
In 1989, Dolan submitted an application to the City proposing
1. In all proceedings of this case below the Supreme Court, John T. Dolan,
husband of Florence Dolan, was also a party. Brief for Petitioner, at ii, Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (No. 93-518). John T. Dolan was deceased
prior to the filing of briefs to the Supreme Court, so the case came before the Court
in the name of Florence Dolan alone. Brief for Petitioner, at ii.
2. Tigard is located on the southwest edge of Portland, Oregon. Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2313 (1994).
3. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313.
4. Id.
5. Id. The site also had a gravel parking lot. Id.
6. Id. A floodplain is the "lowlands bordering a [creek] which may be covered
with water during periods of flood." A. NELSON AND K. D. NELSON, DICTIONARY OF
APPLIED GEOLOGY MINING AND CIVIL ENGINEERING 142 (1967). A hundred-year flood-
plain is "[t]he area subject to inundation from a flood of a magnitude that occurs
once every 100 years on the average (the flood having a one-percent chance of being
equaled or exceeded in any given year)." 7 C.F.R. § 1940.302 (1994).
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improvements to her property.7 Phase One of the proposed im-
provements included demolishing the existing 9,700 square foot
building and constructing a new 17,600 square foot building, as
well as paving an additional 20,200 square feet to be used as a
parking lot.' Phase Two included an additional building on the
northeast corner of the plot for related businesses and additional
parking.' This proposed use of the property was consistent with
the City's zoning regulations for the Central Business Dis-
trict.0
Dolan's application was granted by the City Planning Com-
mission (the "Commission") contingent upon several condi-
tions." The conditions required Dolan to dedicate to the city all
of her property within the hundred-year floodplain of Fanno
Creek as a public recreational greenway and for storm water
drainage improvements. 2 The City also required Dolan to dedi-
cate an additional fifteen-foot strip of land adjacent to the flood-
plain for construction of a pedestrian/bicycle pathway." The
total land area of this required dedication was approximately
7,000 square feet, or ten percent of the total plot owned by
Dolan. 4 The required conditions were imposed pursuant to the
7. Brief for Respondent, at 3, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994)
(No. 93-518).
8. Brief for Petitioner, at 3-4.
9. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2312-14.
10. Id. at 2314 (citing Tigard Community Development Code § 18.66.030)
[hereinafter CDC].
11. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314. Conditions attached to development permits are
often referred to as "exactions." One author defines development exactions as:
[A] form of land-use regulation in which [the government] requires a developer
to give something to the community as a condition to receiving permission to
develop. In the majority of cases, the requisite contribution consists of a land
dedication or a monetary payment. In some cases, however, the exacted contri-
bution may also take the form of an agreement to restrict the use of the
property to which the development exaction is applied.
Nicholas V. Morosoff, Note, " 'Take' My Beach, Please!": Nollan u. California Coastal
Commission and a Rational-Nexus Constitutional Analysis of Development Exactions,
69 B.U. L. REv. 823, 823 (1989).
12. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314.
13. Id. The relevant condition provided:
The applicant shall dedicate to the City as Greenway all portions of the site
that fall within the existing hundred-year floodplain [of Fanno Creek] (i.e., all
portions of the property below elevation 150.0) and all property 15 feet above
(to the east of) the 150.0 foot floodplain boundary. The building shall be de-
signed so as not to intrude into the greenway area.
Id. (quoting City of Tigard Planning Commission Final Order No. 91-09 PC (1991)).
14. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314. The City claimed that the required dedication
did not require the transfer of title in fee simple, but only the grant of an ease-
ment. Brief for Respondent, at 17 n.16. Dolan disputed the City's contention, but the
Court did not address this issue. Petitioner's Reply to Brief for Respondent, at 7,
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (No. 93-518).
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City's Community Development Code (the "CDC").5 The City
had developed the CDC in accordance with Oregon law."6
Dolan challenged the dedication conditions imposed by the
City by appealing the Commission's decision to the Oregon Land
Use Board of Appeals (the "LUBA"). 17 Dolan argued that the
conditions constituted an uncompensated taking in violation of
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution." Because Dolan had failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies by applying for a variance with the
City, the LUBA denied Dolan's claim due to lack of ripeness.'9
Dolan submitted a new application to the City in March, 1991,
15. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314. The relevant portion of the CDC read:
Where landfill and/or development is allowed within and adjacent to the hun-
dred-year floodplain, the city shall require the dedication of sufficient open
land area for greenway adjoining and within the floodplain. This area shall
include portions at a suitable elevation for the construction of a pedestri-
an/bicycle pathway within the floodplain in accordance with the adopted pedes-
trian/bicycle plan.
Id. (quoting CDC § 18.120.180.A.8).
16. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313. In 1973, Oregon enacted a statute requiring all
cities and counties in Oregon to adopt comprehensive land use plans pursuant to
state-wide land use goals. Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.175 (1991 & Supp.
1994)). The goals were to be developed by the Oregon Land Conservation and. Devel-
opment Commission (the "LCDC"). OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.040(2Xa) (1991 &
Supp. 1994). The LCDC adopted two goals in 1975 which were at issue in this case.
Brief for Petitioner, at 4. Goal 5 was "Itlo conserve open space and protect natural
and scenic resources lincludingl any land area that would, if preserved . . . pro-
tect . .. streams . . . enhance the value to the public of ... neighboring parks ...
[and] enhance recreation opportunities." Brief for Petitioner, at 4 (quoting OAR §
660-15-000(5)). Goal 12 Was to "provide and encourage a safe, convenient and eco-
nomic transportation system (which shall] consider all modes of transportation in-
cluding . . . bicycle and pedestrian." Brief for Petitioner, at 5 (quoting OAR § 660-
15-000(12)).
Pursuant to these and other goals, the City developed a comprehensive land
use plan which proposed, inter alia, an open recreational greenway and pedestri-
an/bicycle path along Fanno Creek. Brief for Petitioner, at 5. To implement this
proposal, the plan required that landowners along Fanno Creek "[dedicate] all unde-
veloped land within the hundred-year floodplain plus sufficient open land for
greenway purposes specifically identified for recreation within the plan." Brief for
Petitioner, at 5 (quoting Tigard's Comprehensive Plan). In order to secure these
dedications, the plan required the City to "review each development request adjacent
to areas proposed for pedestrian/bicycle pathways to . . . require the necessary ease-
ment or dedications for the pedestrian/bicycle pathways." Brief for Petitioner, at 6
(quoting Tigard's Comprehensive Plan).
17. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2315. The LUBA is a three member administrative
body appointed by the governor of Oregon with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
local government land use decisions. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 3 n.1, Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (No. 93-518).
18. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2315. The Fifth Amendment provides that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
19. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 20 Or. LUBA 411, 425-26 (1991).
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along with a request for a variance from the CDC regulations
which mandated the conditions.2'
The Commission denied the variance request, and to support
its decision, made a series of findings to demonstrate a relation-
ship between the burdens that would be imposed on the commu-
nity by Dolan's proposed development and the City's required
conditions. 1 The Tigard City Council approved the denial, and
Dolan again appealed to the LUBA, reasserting her constitution-
al claim.' Using the City's factual findings, the LUBA found
that a reasonable relationship existed between the projected
burdens of the proposed development and the relief from such
burdens to be afforded by the City's conditions.' Therefore, the
LUBA rejected Dolan's constitutional claim and affirmed the
decision of the Commission.'
Dolan appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals which af-
firmed the decision of the LUBA.2" The court applied the ratio-
nale from the Supreme Court's decision in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission." Based upon its interpretation of Nollan,
20. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 22 Or. LUBA 617, 619 (1992), aff'd, 832 P.2d 853
(Or. Ct. App. 1992), aft'd, 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
The CDC regulations provided that the city would grant a variance only where the
applicant showed that compliance would cause 'an undue or unnecessary hardship."
Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314 (quoting CDC § 18.134.010). Dolan's variance request did
not propose alternative measures to the City's conditions as allowed by the CDC,
but simply argued that her proposed development was not inconsistent with the
City's comprehensive land use plan. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314.
21. Id. The Commission's findings included:
It is reasonable to assume that customers and employees of the future uses of
this site could utilize a pedestrian/bicycle pathway adjacent to this develop-
ment for their transportation and recreational needs. . . . [and that the path-
way] could offset some of the traffic demand on these nearby streets and less-
en the increase in traffic congestion . . . . [Tihe anticipated increased storm
water flow from the subject property to an already strained creek and drain-
age basin can only add to the public need to manage the stream channel and
floodplain for drainage purposes.
Id. at 2314-15 (quoting City of Tigard Planning Commission Final Order No. 91-09
PC (1991)).
22. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2315. The LUBA assumed that the factual findings of
the City were supported by substantial evidence because Dolan never challenged the
factual findings or the sufficiency of the evidence used to support the City's denial
of her variance request. Dolan, 22 Or. LUBA at 622-23.
23. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2315 (quoting Dolan, 22 Or. LUBA at 626-27).
24. Dolan, 22 Or. LUBA at 627-28.
25. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2315.
26. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853, 853 (Or. Ct. App. 1992), affd, 854
P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (citing Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)). The court of appeals interpreted Nollan as setting
forth a three-part test for a takings evaluation of development exactions. Dolan, 832
P.2d at 853. First, there had to be a legitimate government interest at stake. Id.
Second, an essential nexus between the exaction and the governmental interest had
to exist. Id. at 853-54. The third and final inquiry, and the question relevant to the
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the court asserted that there had to be a "reasonable relation-
ship" between the exactions and the burdens imposed by the
proposed development.2 The court agreed with the LUBA that
the findings of the City demonstrated a direct and reasonable
relationship between the exactions and the impacts of Dolan's.
proposed development, and affirmed the LUBA's decision.'
Dolan appealed to the Supreme Court of Oregon which af-
firmed the lower court's decision.29 The court concluded that
the City's factual findings, unchallenged by Dolan, were consti-
tutionally sufficient to support the conditions."0
Dolan appealed the decision of the Supreme Court of Oregon
to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari"'
to determine what degree of connection was required between an
exaction and burdens of the proposed development in order to
satisfy the Takings Clause." The Court reversed the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Oregon." The Court began its analysis
by noting that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's
case at bar, was what degree of connection had to exist between the exaction and
the burdens imposed by the development. Id. at 854. See notes 143-50 and accompa-
nying text for a detailed discussion of Nollan.
27. Dolan, 832 P.2d at 854. The court described this test only as somewhere
between "specifically and uniquely attributable" and "some relationship." Id.
28. Id. at 856.
29. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 444 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct.
2309 (1994). In earlier challenges, Dolan had asserted a claim under Article I, sec-
tion 18, of the Oregon Constitution (Takings Clause), but before the Oregon Supreme
Court, Dolan expressly limited her appeal to a federal claim. Dolan, 854 P.2d at 438
n.2.
30. Id. at 443. Justice Peterson dissented, opining that federal precedents re-
quired that the government meet a high threshold by showing with precision that
required land use conditions were made necessary by proposed development. Dolan,
854 P.2d at 448-49 (Peterson, J., dissenting). The dissent questioned the City's con-
tention that the condition imposed upon Dolan was attributable to her proposed
change in use. Id. The dissent proffered that the City decided that it needed a flood
control greenway and pedestrian/bicycle path along Fanno Creek and saw develop-
ment exactions as a way of getting the easements free of charge. Id.
31. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993).
32. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2312 (1994). The Supreme Court
had jurisdiction pursuant to the Federal Code of the Judiciary and Judicial Proce-
dure, which provided that, "Iflinal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court by writ of certiorari ... where any ... right . . . [is] claimed under the
Constitution . . . [ofl the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
Before the Supreme Court, Dolan was represented by Oregonians in Action Legal
Center, a non-profit organization dedicated to the protection of landowner rights.
Letter from Dorothy S. Cofield, Staff Attorney, Oregonians In Action Legal Center,
(September 26, 1994).
33. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2322. The majority opinion was authored by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, who was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thom-
as. Id. at 2312.
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Due Process Clause. 4 The Court opined that had the City de-
manded that Dolan dedicate part of her property for public use
in the absence of the development proposal, the action would
have been a taking.35 The Court noted, however, that when
state and local governments were engaged in land use planning,
the rights of the private property owner had to be balanced with
the legitimate interests of the state." Because the regulation
placed on Dolan was in the form of a development exaction, the
applicable precedent for performing this balancing was found in
Nollan.7
The Court held that in order to survive a takings challenge,
not only must a development exaction have an essential nexus
with a legitimate state interest, but also a rough proportionality
must exist between the development exaction and the burdens to
be imposed by the proposed development. s The Court then ap-
plied its newly defined test to the exactions demanded by the
City in the case at bar. 9 The Court first turned to the recre-
ational greenway within the floodplain of Fanno Creek." The
Court recognized that the larger impervious surface area would
increase flooding pressures on Fanno Creek and that an open
floodplain might relieve such pressures.4 However, the Court
took issue with the City's requirement that the greenway be a
34. Id. at 2316. The relevant section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that, "W[no State . . . shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2316-17. The Court viewed Nollan as creating a two-step process to
determine if the imposed conditions on land development constituted a taking. Id. at
2317. First, the Court asserted that it must be determined if an essential nexus ex-
isted between the legitimate state interest being pursued and the exaction. Id. Sec-
ond, if the exaction passed this first test, a determination was made whether the
necessary degree of connection existed between the exaction and burdens which
would be imposed by the proposed development. Id. The Court never reached this
second question in Nollan because the exaction in that case did not pass the first
step: the essential nexus test. Id. Therefore, the question left open by Nollan was
how to define this necessary degree of connection in order to determine whether the
exaction effected a taking. Id. at 2312.
To answer this question, the Court reviewed the tests which various state
courts had been using for a number of years, but ultimately established a new test
which the Court termed "rough proportionality." Id. at 2319. In describing this test,
the Court held that mathematical precision was not required, but that the govern-
ment had to make an individualized determination to demonstrate that the exaction
related both in nature and extent to the burdens imposed by the proposed develop-
ment. Id. at 2319-20.
38. Id. at 2317-20.
39. Id. at 2320.
40. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320.
41. Id.
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public as opposed to a private greenway, noting that the right to
exclude others was "one of the essential sticks in the bundle of
rights commonly characterized as property."42 Because the
City's findings did not show how flood control would be promot-
ed by a public greenway, the Court held that the City failed to
establish the required relationship.43
As to the pedestrian/bicycle pathway, the Court recognized
that a larger store would increase traffic congestion within the
City's Central Business District." In its findings, the City had
estimated that Dolan's larger store would generate an additional
435 trips per day and then concluded that the pathway "could
offset some of the traffic demand ... and lessen the increase in
traffic congestion."45 The Court dismissed this statement as
merely conclusory, and held that the City's findings failed to
demonstrate the required relationship between the number of
additional trips and the need for a pedestrian/bicycle path-
way.46 The Court, therefore, reversed the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Oregon and remanded the case.47
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the new hurdle
created by the majority, the rough proportionality test, had abso-
lutely no precedent in federal or state courts.' The dissent also
noted that for many years the Court had focused its analysis on
whether the government action had interfered with the property
rights as a whole. 49 Therefore, the dissent contended that the
Court's focus on one stick of the bundle of property rights was
misguided." The dissent was also concerned that the Court's
willingness to micro-manage the local government's decisions
would lead to a flood of litigation in the federal courts.5 The
dissent disagreed with placing the burden of demonstrating
constitutionality on the City, noting that the Court's precedent
42. Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
43. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2321-22 (quoting City of Tigard Planning Commission Final Order
No. 91-09 PC (1991)).
46. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321-22. The Court did not define with specificity
what additional showing the City needed to make in order to support its conclusion;
however, Dolan had argued that the City should have conducted a study determining
how many additional pedestrian, bicycle and automobile trips the new store would
generate, and how those numbers compared to existing traffic loads. Brief for Peti-
tioner, at 28-29.
47. D-an, 114 S. Ct. at 2322.
48. Id. at 2323 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined by Justices
Blackmun and Ginsburg. Id. at 2312.
49. Id. at 2324.
50. Id. at 2325.
51. Id. at 2326.
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on the Takings Clause had always required the property owner
to prove that the land use regulations unreasonably impaired
the economic value of the parcel as a whole. 2
The American concept of property rights has roots which ex-
tend deep into English Constitutional law. 3 Indeed, important
guarantees of the Magna Carta included protection from arbi-
trary government confiscation of property.' In the land-abun-
dant American colonies, early laws reflected the principles of
property rights embodied in the Magna Carta, including the
right to compensation when the government took private
land.5 The Bill of Rights, ratified in 1791, included in the Fifth
Amendment a clause drafted by James Madison which guaran-
teed a right to compensation for the taking of private proper-
ty.56 In its first century, the Supreme Court most often applied
the Takings Clause to cases involving exercise of government
eminent domain powers.57 Late in the nineteenth century, how-
ever, the Court began to consider the theory that an exercise of
the police powers which limited the use and value of private
property, could constitute a taking as well.5 8
52. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also
filed a dissent, arguing that the Court misapplied its new test to the facts and that
this case was not a suitable vehicle for announcing new takings jurisprudence. Id. at
2330-31 (Souter, J., dissenting).
53. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONs rITu-
TIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 13 (1992).
54. ELY, cited at note 53, at 13. The Magna Carta provided that "[n]o freeman
shall be . . . disseised . . . except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the
law of the land." Id. (quoting the Magna Carta). The Magna Carta also declared
that the king had to make payments for property seized. ELY, cited at note 53, at
23.
55. ELY, cited at note 53, at 13-24.
56. Id. at 54-55. The Takings Clause provides that "private property [shall
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
57. ELY, cited at note 53, at 91-92. Eminent domain is the "right of the state,
through its regular organization, to reassert, either temporarily or permanently, its
dominion over any portion of the soil of the state on account of public exigency and
for the public good." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 523 (6th ed. 1990).
58. ELY, cited at note 53, at 92. Police power is defined as the:
[Plower of the state to place restraints on the personal freedom and property
rights of persons for the protection of public safety, health, and morals or the
promotion of the public convenience and general prosperity. The police power
is subject to limitations of the federal and state constitutions, and especially
to the requirement of due process.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1156 (6th ed. 1990). Originally, the guarantees in the Bill
of Rights only afforded protection against actions of the federal government. ELY,
cited at note 53, at 54. The Takings Clause was later held to be applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, B.
& Q. R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236-37 (1897).
The theory that an exercise of the police powers can effect a taking is often
referred to as regulatory takings. See William J. Patton, Affirmative Relief for Regu-
Vol. 33:985
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In Mugler v. Kansas,"9 the defendant had been engaged in
the manufacturing and sale of beer for several years before Kan-
sas passed a law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of all
intoxicating liquors.' The constitutional issue was whether the
Kansas statute constituted a taking of defendant's beer making
establishment because the law effected a significant diminution
of the value of the property.61 The Court held that no taking
had occurred. 2 The Court reasoned that as long as the state
was engaged in a valid exercise of police powers for purposes of
protecting the health, safety or morals of the public, the princi-
ples of eminent domain did not apply." The Court further rea-
soned that by preventing property owners from using their prop-
erty in a noxious way, the state should not have to bear the
burden of compensating individual owners for pecuniary losses,
even if the prohibited use was legal when the owners began
operating.' Therefore, the Court concluded that a valid exer-
cise of state police powers for the purpose of abating a nuisance
could not be deemed a taking upon property. 5
The first Supreme Court case to recognize that an exercise of
the police power could effect a taking was Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon." Pennsylvania's Kohler Act of 192167 prohibited the
latory Takings, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1215, 1215 n.1 (1987). The type of police power
exercise most often challenged in regulatory takings cases is land use regulation. See
Paula C. Murray, Regulatory Takings: When Does A Regulation Go "Too Far"? 22
REAL EST. L. J. 253, 263 (1994).
59. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
60. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 653.
61. Id. at 664. The buildings and equipment on the property were especially
suited for the brewing of beer and had little value for any other use. Id. at 657.
62. Id. at 664-69.
63. Id. at 668-69. The exercise of a state's police powers, unlike the exercise of
eminent domain powers, did not transfer control of the property to the state, effect a
physical invasion of the property, or restrict the owner's right to dispose of such
property. Id. It merely prohibited a particular use that the legislature found offen-
sive to public health, morals or safety. Id. at 668.
64. Id. at 669.
65. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69.
66. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
67. The text of the Kohler Act read:
It shall be unlawful for any owner, operator, director, or general manager,
superintendent, or other person in charge of, or having supervision, over, any
anthracite coal mine or mining operation, so to mine anthracite coal or so to
conduct the operation of mining anthracite coal as to cause the caving-in,
collapse, or subsidence of -
(a) Any public building or any structure customarily used by the public
as a place of resort, assemblage, or amusement, including, but not being
limited to, churches, schools, hospitals, theatres, hotels, and railroad
stations.
(b) Any street, road, bridge, or other public passage-way, dedicated to
public use or habitually used by the public.
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mining of anthracite coal in such a way as to cause subsidence
beneath any structure used for human habitation, with certain
exceptions." The plaintiffs had acquired the surface estate from
the defendant coal company in 1878 by a deed which expressly
reserved in the defendant, the right to mine all coal from the
subsurface. 9 The issue was whether the Kohler Act effected a.
taking of the property rights that the defendants had in the
coal.70
In this famous opinion by Justice Holmes, the Court held the
statute to be an invalid taking without compensation. 71 The
Court did not view the law as prohibiting a public nuisance, but
as conferring a benefit upon the private surface property owners
who were short-sighted in failing to acquire the support es-
tate.72 The Court also recognized that the coal companies suf-
fered a great loss because the state had destroyed their right to
mine certain coal and to profit by it, which, constitutionally, was
no different than a taking.73 In finding the statute invalid, the
Court concluded that the state could use its police powers to
regulate property, but if such regulation "goes too far," the
state's action was then a taking.74
(c) Any track, roadbed, right of way, pipe, conduit, wire, or other facili-
ty, used in the service of the public by any municipal corporation or
public service company as defined by the Public Service Company Law.
(d) Any dwelling or other structure used as a human habitation, or any
factory, store, or other industrial or mercantile establishment in which
human labor is employed.
(e) Any cemetery or public burial ground.
52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 661 (1966).
68. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412-13.
69. Id. at 412. Pennsylvania recognizes three separate estates in land: the sur-
face estate, the mineral estate, and the support estate. See Keystone Bituminous
Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 478 (1987). Beginning in the 1890's,
coal companies began severing the mineral and support estates from the surface
estate, and conveying away the latter. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 478. As part of the
transaction, the coal companies generally secured a waiver of claims for damages
resulting from the mining of coal. Id.
70. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
71. Id. at 414.
72. Id. at 413-15.
73. Id. at 414. Indeed, the Court admonished that, "[wie are in danger of for-
getting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying
for the change." Id. at 416.
74. Id. at 415. The Court did not expound a specific proposition to be used to
determine when a regulation "goes too far" noting that such a determination depend-
ed upon the particular facts of the case. Id. at 413.
The dissent viewed the Kohler Act as preventing a public nuisance, and that
its purpose did not cease to be public simply because certain benefits were inciden-
tally imposed upon private parties. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 417-18 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). The dissent also propounded that the measure of the value of the
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The Court addressed the regulatory takings issue in the con-
text of a wartime emergency in United States v. Central Eureka
Mining.5 The War Production Board ordered the closure of gold
mines in order to reserve mining workers and equipment for the
mining of copper and other nonferrous metals that were essen-
tial to the war effort."6 The issue was whether this wartime
order constituted a taking of the mine owner's right to operate
and profit from the gold mines." The Court held in favor of the
government.7" The Court noted that the order was not a physi-
cal seizure of the gold mines.79 The Court also found that the
order was reasonably related to the war effort, and that the
temporary restrictions placed on the gold mine owners were
insignificant when compared to the importance of the legitimate
interest that the government was pursuing." Therefore, the
Court determined that any incidental loss to property owners
effected by a legitimate government wartime regulation was not
a taking."'
The Court addressed the issue of burden of proof for a regula-
tory takings claim in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead.". The
appellants owned a lot which had been used for sand and gravel
mining since 1927.' In 1958, the Town of Hempstead passed
an ordinance prohibiting any excavation below the water table,
which effectively prohibited any further mining on the
appellants' lot." The issue was whether the ordinance consti-
tuted a taking of the appellants' property." The Court held
loss to the Coal Company should not have focused exclusively on the pillars of coal
which were left in place in order to afford the required support. Id. at 419. The
dissent concluded that such value was relative, and was perhaps negligible when
compared to the value of all the remaining coal that the company could still mine.
Id.
75. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
76. Central Eureka, 357 U.S. at 156-57.
77. Id. at 156-57.
78. Id. at 157.
79. Id. at 165-66. The government did not occupy or use the mines or the
gold. Id. The purpose of the closure order was to encourage voluntary re-allocation of
mining resources to the war effort. Id. at 166.
80. Id. at 166-69.
81. Central Eureka, 357 U.S. at 166-69.
82. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
83. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 591. Most of the mining took place below the water
table. Id. The water table is "Itihe uiper limit of the zone of permanent [groundwa-
ter] saturation, and follows approximately the profile of the land surface." A. NELSON
& K. D. NELSON, DICTIONARY OF APPLIED GEOLOGY MINING AND CIVIL ENGINEERING
405 (1967).
84. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 591.
85. Id. at 594.
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there to be no taking." Citing Pennsylvania Coal, the Court
noted that an otherwise valid exercise of police power was not a
taking unless the regulation was too onerous (i.e., "goes too
far").5 7 Affording the state the presumption of constitutionality,
the Court determined 'that the appellants failed to carry their
burden of showing the ordinance to be an invalid exercise of
police power." Further, because there was no evidence in the
record demonstrating diminution of the value of the lot, the
Court concluded that the appellants failed to show that the
regulation had gone too far." In Goldblatt, the Court estab-
lished that in challenging a land use regulation under the Tak-
ings Clause, the burden was on the landowner to demonstrate
either that the law was not a valid exercise of police power or
that it went too far in diminishing the value of the property."
In the half-century after Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme
Court addressed very few regulatory takings cases. Central Eu-
reka Mining and Goldblatt may be the only two notable exam-
ples of such decisions handed down by the Supreme Court in
that period. With the next case, the Court began an era of great-
er involvement in defining when a land use regulation rose to
the level of a taking.
The first objective standard for evaluating a regulatory taking
claim was defined in Penn Central Transportation v. City of New
York. 1 In 1967, the City of New York had designated the
Grand Central Terminal (the "Terminal"), owned and operated
by the appellants, an historic landmark.' The City of New
York denied the appellants a permit to construct an office build-
ing over the Terminal in order to preserve the appearance of its
facade.9" The issue was whether the permit denial had effected
86. Id. at 592-96.
87. Id. at 594 (citing Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415).
88. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 595-96. For that purpose, the Town of Hempstead
claimed that the regulation was justified as a safety measure. Id. at 595. Exercise of
police power was valid if it is reasonably related to a legitimate government inter-
est. Id. at 594-95. Here, the government benefitted from the presumption of reason-
ableness, and the record lacked any evidence to the contrary. Id. at 595-96.
89. Id. at 594.
90. Id. at 594-96.
91. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, noted that
Supreme Court takings jurisprudence to date had been a series of "ad hoc, factual
inquiries." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
92. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115-16. The designation was made by the City's
Landmarks Preservation Commission pursuant to the Landmarks Preservation Law
of 1965. N.Y.C. Admin. Code, ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0, reprinted in PATRICK J.
ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 53.0312]Ij][ii] (1991). The Terminal,
opened in 1913, was valued for its clever engineering as well as its aesthetically
pleasing French beaux-arts style. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115.
93. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 117-18. The New York City Landmarks Preser-
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a taking of the appellants' property." The Court held that no
taking had occurred.95
The Court first considered the validity of the City's landmark
laws in general.' The Court rejected the appellants' argument
that the City's landmark laws were inherently unfair or discrim-
inatory because they imposed burdens only on selected property
owners. 7 The Court observed that the selection of landmark
sites was part of a comprehensive plan to preserve structures
with historic or aesthetic value throughout the city.98 The ap-
pellants also argued that cases in which the government was
preventing a noxious use of land were distinguishable because
the appellant's proposed office building was a beneficial use."
The Court rejected this argument as well, finding that the alter-
ation of a historic landmark could be considered harmful.1
° °
Having established that the City's landmark laws were valid
in general, the Court next turned to the question of whether the
regulation of the appellants' property had gone too far and
therefore rose to the level of an impermissible taking.'' The
Court noted that the appropriate focus of the takings determina-
tion was on the parcel of property as a whole (i.e., the entire
landmark site) and rejected the appellants' claim that the City
of New York had taken the air rights above the Terminal, irre-
spective of the value of the rest of the site.' The Court found
that even with the City's restriction, the appellants could contin-
ue to use the property as it had been used for the last sixty-five
years, and the appellants would be able to make a reasonable
return on its investment from operation of the Terminal. 3
In addition, the Court concluded that the City of New York
had not denied the appellants all use of the air rights above the
terminal, but had given the appellants transferable development
vation Law requires that the Landmarks Preservation Commission pre-approve any
plans for exterior improvements of a landmark. Id. at 112 (citing N.Y.C. Admin.
Code, ch. 8-A, §§ 207-4.0 to 207-9.0 (1976)).
94. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107.
95. Id. at 138.
96. Id. at 128-36.
97. Id. at 131.
98. Id. at 132-33.
99. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134 n.30.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 135-36. The Court concluded that the essential factual question cen-
tered upon determining the severity of the economic impact of the landmark law
upon the appellant's property interest. Id. at 136.
102. Id. at 130. The Court propounded that takings law did not divide up the
parcel into discrete segments to determine if the rights to a particular segment had
been lost. Id.
103. Id. at 136.
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rights which could be used at several sites near the Termi-
nal."4 Because these rights had some value, the Court deter-
mined that they also had to be considered in determining wheth-
er a taking had occurred.' Therefore, the Court concluded
that as long as a land use regulation was substantially related
to a legitimate state interest and allowed the landowner to re-
tain a reasonable return on its overall investment, the regula-
tion would not be deemed a taking.0 6
The Court became more receptive to regulatory takings claims
with Kaiser Aetna v. United States.0 7 A marina developer
made improvements to its private pond and marina causing the
pond to become connected to Maunalua Bay and the Pacific
Ocean.'08 The connection caused the private pond to become a
"navigable water of the United States" subject to regulation by
the Army Corps of Engineers (the "Corps").' The issue before
104. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137. Under New York City Zoning law, the
owner of a landmark could sever, sell, and transfer its unused height and density
development rights to another property, which could be a site adjacent to or across
the street or intersection. See Margaret Giordano, Note, Over-Stuffing the Envelope:
The Problems with Creative Transfer of Development Rights, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
43, 43-44 (1988). The purchaser of the development rights could then build a
structure which exceeded the height and density restrictions allowed by the zoning
designation of the receiving parcel. Id. at 44.
105. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137.
106. Id. at 135-38. The dissent, focusing exclusively on the "air rights" portion
of the parcel, noted that the City had literally destroyed this substantial property
right belonging to the appellants. Id. at 143 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Further, the
dissent asserted that there were two exceptions to the rule that government destruc-
tion of property constituted a taking, and the case at bar did not fall into either
exception. Id. at 138. First, citing Mugler, the dissent opined that the prohibition of
a property use which constituted a nuisance was not a taking. Id. at 144-45 (citing
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669). In Penn Central, the City of New York was not prohibit-
ing a nuisance, but requiring the appellants to maintain their property so as to
confer a benefit on sightseeing New Yorkers and tourists. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
145-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The second exception, the dissent concluded, exist-
ed where the government prohibited a non-noxious use, but the property owner
gained a reciprocity of advantage, such as with zoning (i.e., a property owner whose
property may lose some value from zoning restrictions reciprocally benefits from
similar restrictions placed on the property of his neighbors). Id. at 147. The dissent
distinguished zoning restrictions from New York's landmark laws in that the appel-
lants received no reciprocal benefits from the 400 other designated landmarks
throughout New York City. Id. The restrictions on the appellants, therefore, consti-
tuted a taking, and did not become non-compensable simply because the government
had allowed them to retain a "reasonable rate of return." Id. at 149-50.
107. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
108. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 165-67. The site at issue was located on the
Hawaiian island of Oahu. Id. at 166.
109. Id. at 168-69. The authority of the Corps over navigable waters of the
United States was established by the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of
1899. Id. at 168 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1988 & Supp. 1994)). The law requires a
permit from the Corps prior to commencement of any structural modifications to
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the Court was whether the government could prohibit Kaiser
Aetna from denying the public access to the pond, i.e., impose a
navigational servitude, without effecting a taking."' The Court
held that the imposition of a navigational servitude constituted
a taking."' The Court noted, in a majority opinion by Justice
Rehnquist, that the right to exclude others was an essential
stick within the bundle of rights afforded by property owner-
ship."' Therefore, the Court held that the government's cre-
ation of a public right of access on private property was a regu-
lation which "goes too far" and amounted to a taking.1
The Court applied the regulatory takings analysis to zoning
ordinances in Agins v. City of Tiburon."4 In Agins, the devel-
opers purchased five acres of land in the City of Tiburon for resi-
dential development." 5 The City of Tiburon subsequently re-
zoned the property."6 The developers sued, claiming that the
rezoning prevented residential development of the tract, com-
pletely destroying its value." 7 The Court rejected this claim as
facially inconsistent with explicit terms of the ordinance, and
therefore limited the issue to be decided to whether the mere
enactment of a zoning law effected a taking."8 The Court be-
gan the analysis by noting that zoning ordinances were a valid
exercise of police power in that they advanced the legitimate
government goal of controlling urbanization."' As to the bur-
dens that zoning restrictions imposed upon the developers, the
Court concluded that there was a benefit of reciprocity from the
burdens placed on other landowners. 20 Even with the restric-
navigable waters of the United States. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 169 n.2 (quoting 33
U.S.C. § 403).
110. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 172. This was the sole issue before the Court
because the developer did not appeal the portion of the lower court decision which
held that the pond was now subject to the Corps' permit regulations. Id. at 169 n.3.
111. Id at 180.
112. Id. at 179-80. The Court found the right to exclude others to be so funda-
mental an element of property rights that the government must compensate the
landowner before destroying it. Id.
113. Id. at 178. The Court noted that imposition of the navigational servitude
was not a mere regulation of property, but constituted an actual physical invasion.
Id. at 180.
114. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
115. Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.
116. Id. The new zoning designation was "Residential Planned Development and
Open Space Zone, RPD-1" with density restrictions which would limit development to
between one and five single-family residences in the five-acre parcel. Id.
117. Id. at 258.
118. Id. at 259-60. Zoning ordinances have been generally considered constitu-
tional since such laws had survived Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due
process challenges. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
119. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
120. Id. at 262. The zoning law also applied to the surrounding properties
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tions, the Court found that the landowners were still able to
fulfill reasonable investment expectations by submitting develop-
ment proposals to the City of Tiburon. 2' Accordingly, the
Court determined that the zoning ordinances, on their face, did
not effect a taking.'22
The Court created its first category of de facto takings in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 22 The State of New
York passed a statute prohibiting any landlord from interfering
with the installation of cable television facilities across his prop-
erty and from demanding payment for such installation from the
cable television company beyond the one-time, one dollar fee
authorized by the statute.'24 The installed cables provided ser-
vice to appellant's tenants and were part of the cable "highway,"
providing service to other buildings on the block.'25 The issue
was whether the state's regulation requiring the appellant to
allow the cable equipment on her property constituted a tak-
ing.
126
Citing Penn Central, the Court noted that takings jurispru-
dence generally involved "ad hoc [factual] inquiries."'27 None-
theless, the Court recognized that important factors to consider
in making such inquiries were the severity of the interference
with investment-backed expectations and the character of the
governmental action." The Court characterized the cable stat-
ute as a permanent physical invasion and reasoned that this
type of governmental action was of unusually serious charac-
ter. 2 Such character, therefore, was not simply an important
factor in deciding whether a taking had occurred, but was deter-
minative.' Therefore, the Court held that a government ac-
tion which effected a permanent physical occupation was a de
facto taking without regard to other factors such as the value of
within the zone, assuring careful and orderly residential development, thereby bene-
fiting all burdened properties. Id.
121. Id. The Court found that the appellants could build up to five houses on
their five-acre parcel. Id.
122. Id. at 259.
123. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
124. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423-24. Pursuant to the statute, the local cable televi-
sion company had installed approximately 36 feet of one-half inch cable along the
appellant's Manhattan apartment building, and two large silver cable boxes which
were fastened to the masonry of the building by various bolts, nails, and screws. Id.
at 422.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 421.
127. Id. at 432 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
128. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
129. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
130. Id.
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the public benefit or the insignificance of the burden on the
landowner. 3'
The Court again analyzed a Pennsylvania statute which
placed restrictions on underground coal mining in order to pre-
vent mine subsidence in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association
v. DeBenedictis."' As implemented by the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Environmental Resources, the Subsidence Act re-
quired fifty percent of the coal beneath certain structures to be
left in place."3 The issue was whether the Subsidence Act, on
its face, constituted a taking of the petitioners' property."' The
Court held that this takings challenge to the Subsidence Act
must fail.
35
The Keystone Court distinguished this case from Pennsylvania
Coal.13 The Court found that a legitimate public interest was
served by the Subsidence Act." 7 As to the second part of the
test, the Keystone Court found that the petitioner had not dem-
onstrated that the Subsidence Act caused the mining of bitumi-
nous coal in Pennsylvania to be economically impracticable."8
The Court rejected the argument of the petitioner that they were
131. Id. at 426-441.
132. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). The relevant section of the Bituminous Mine Sub-
sidence and Land Conservation Act ("Subsidence Act") provides:
In order to guard the health, safety and general welfare of the public, no
owner, operator, lessor, lessee, or general manager, superintendent or other
person in charge of or having supervision over any bituminous coal mine shall
mine bituminous coal so as to cause damage as a result of the caving-in,
collapse or subsidence of the following surface structures in place on April 27,
1966, overlying or in the proximity of the mine:
(1) Any public building or any noncommercial structure customarily used
by the public, including but not being limited to churches, schools, hos-
pitals, and municipal utilities or municipal public service operations.
(2) Any dwelling used for human habitation; and
(3) Any cemetery or public burial ground; unless the current owner of
the structure consents and the resulting damage is fully repaired or
compensated.
52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1406.4 (1966 & Supp. 1994).
133. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 476-77.
134. Id. at 474.
135. Id at 501-02.
136. Id. at 484-85. The majority noted the two-part test laid down in Pennsyl-
vania Coal: that the government action would be found to be a taking if it did not
substantially advance legitimate public interest or if it denied the landowner all
economically viable use of the land. Id. at 485 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
137. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485. The Court deferred to the findings of the Penn-
sylvania legislature that such regulations were necessary in order to preserve the
health, safety, and general welfare of the public. Id. This was contrasted with the
finding of the majority in Pennsylvania Coal that the Kohler Act was designed to
primarily benefit private parties who failed to purchase the support estate. Id. at
486 (citing Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414).
138. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495-96.
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denied all economically viable use of certain narrowly defined
portions of their property, holding that the takings test required
a comparison of the relative value of that taken with that which
remained."9 Considering such relative values, the effect of the
Subsidence Act required operators to leave in place only about
two percent of all their coal. 4 The Court also rejected the
petitioner's argument that the Subsidence Act completely de-
stroyed the value of the support estate, which was recognized in
Pennsylvania as a separate interest in land.' The Court con-
cluded that a takings challenge to a land use regulation would
fail if the landowner could neither overcome the presumption
that the government action pursued a legitimate public interest
nor demonstrated that the action deprived him of economically
viable use of his property as a whole.'
The Court was receptive to the landowners' takings claim in
its first exaction case, Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion.43 The appellants in Nollan owned beachfront property in
Ventura County with an existing small bungalow.'" When the
appellants applied to the state for a permit to demolish the
bungalow and replace it with a larger house, the state granted
the permit subject to the condition that the appellants allow a
public easement across their property in order that the public
may have easier access between the public beaches.'45 The is-
sue was whether the state's demand for this development exac-
tion constituted a taking.4 '
The Court noted that had the state demanded the easement
unconditionally, a taking would have occurred because the pub-
139. Id. at 496-97. The Court recognized that takings law did not divide up the
parcel into discrete segments to determine if the rights to a particular segment had
been lost. Id. at 497 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31).
140. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496. In contrast, the majority in Pennsylvania Coal
found ample evidence that the Kohler Act rendered entire mines unprofitable. Id. at
498-99 (citing Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414).
141. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 500. Because the support estate had no inherent
value unless it was owned by either the owner of the surface estate or the owner of
the mineral estate, it was essentially one of the sticks within a bundle of property
rights and could not be considered in a vacuum from the petitioners' property as a
whole. Id.
142. Id. at 485-502. The dissent propounded that the opinion in Pennsylvania
Coal was the cornerstone of takings jurisprudence, and that the language and the
holding of the case deserved greater deference than that which was given by the
majority. Id. at 508 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissent viewed the
factual differences between Pennsylvania Coal and Keystone as trivial. Id. at 508-09.
143. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). See note 11 for the definition of an exaction.
144. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827. Local public beaches lie to the north and to the
south of the appellants' private property. Id.
145. Id. at 828.
146. Id. at 827.
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lic easement amounted to a "permanent physical occupa-
tion."147 The permit condition, the Court reasoned, did not con-
stitute a taking if the condition served the same legitimate state
interest as would the denial of the permit.'" Therefore, the
Court held that the state had to demonstrate an essential nexus
between a development exaction and the public interest bur-
dened by the grant of the development permit, or else the exac-
tion would be deemed a taking.' Using this standard, the
Court found that the state failed to demonstrate an essential
nexus between the interest to be advanced by denying the per-
mit for the larger house (protecting the public's ability to view
the beach from the road, according to the state) and the right of
lateral access across the appellants' beach. 5'
The Court created another category of de facto takings in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.'5' The statute at is-
sue was the Beachfront Management Act (the "Act")52 which
prohibited the petitioner from erecting any permanent habitable
structure on his two beachfront lots. 5 ' The restriction had ren-
dered the lots valueless."M The issue was whether this total
economic deprivation effected a taking.'65 The Court held that
absent a showing by the state that the statute did no more than
prohibit a common law nuisance, a taking had occurred.'56
Although recognizing that takings jurisprudence involved
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries," the Court nevertheless
147. Id. at 831 (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432-33 n.9).
148. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.
149. Id, at 836-42.
150. Id. at 837-39. The Court rejected the contention of the state that the
blockage of the view from the road would create a "psychological barrier" to beach
access in the collective mind of the public, and such "psychological barrier" could be
alleviated by affording the public greater lateral access across the beach. Id. at 838.
The dissent considered the majority's insistence on an exact match between
the condition and the burdens imposed by the proposed development as too restric-
tive of the state's ability to exercise its police powers. Id. at 845-46 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The dissent also found that the condition in the case was minimally
intrusive and did not interfere with the appellants' investment-backed expectations.
Id. at 853-55 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). In addition, the dissent conclud-
ed that the appellants received a reciprocity of advantage by gaining permission to
proceed with their development. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 856 (citing Pennsylvania Coal,
260 U.S. at 415).
151. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
152. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-250 to 48-39-360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
153. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889. The law prohibited development too close to
South Carolina's beach/dune system in order to protect people and property from
storms, high tides, and beach erosion. Id. at 2898 n.ll.
154. Id. at 2896. The trial court's finding was not challenged before the Su-
preme Court. Id. at 2896 n.9.
155. Id. at 2889.
156. Id. at 2901-02
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noted that there were two discrete categories of cases in which a
taking would be found without a fact specific evaluation of the
public interest to be advanced by the regulation.'57 The first
was where the regulation caused a permanent physical invasion
of the property.15 The second, as in the instant case, was
where the regulation prohibited all economically beneficial use of
the land.15 The only exception to this second proposition was if
the regulation prohibited a use that was not part of the original
title of the estate; most notably, if such use would be prevent-
able through a court action under the state's existing common
law of public or private nuisance.' Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that a land use regulation which rendered property val-
ueless was a de facto taking unless the state showed that the
regulation did no more than codify existing common law nui-
sance doctrine.16'
Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal was the first
recognition that a state's exercise of its police power could be
deemed a taking if it goes too far.'62 In the seven decades since
that decision, the Court has struggled to define where "too far"
is. The Court's series of "ad hoc factual inquiries" has been per-
meated with an occasional per se rule, i.e., Loretto""3 (perma-
nent physical occupation always amounts to a taking) and
Lucas' (total deprivation of value is always a taking unless
regulation simply prohibits a nuisance). Unfortunately, the "ad
hoc factual inquiries" fail to provide reliable precedent. Cases
which are seemingly factually similar, such as Pennsylvania
Coal and Keystone, yield opposite results without the latter opin-
ion overruling the former. Predictability of a Supreme Court
ruling in a regulatory takings case depends more upon the ideol-
ogy of the Court at the time of the decision than upon any Court
precedent. It appears as if the outcome in a given case is deter-
157. Id. at 2893.
158. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-40).
159. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
160. Id. at 2899-900.
161. Id. at 2896-901. The case was remanded to the South Carolina Supreme
Court for a determination of whether background principles of state nuisance and
property law would prohibit Lucas' proposed development. Id. at 2901-02.
The dissent took issue with the majority's placing of the burden to demon-
strate constitutionality upon the state, thereby dispensing with the usual pre-
sumption afforded the legislature. Id. at 2909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent
also objected to the creation of a new per se category of takings which obviated the
need for any case-by-case inquiry. Id. at 2910.
162. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
163. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426-41.
164. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896-2901.
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mined first and supporting rationale is developed later. If the
decision is pro-police power, the rationale generally involves
affording the government a presumption of constitutionality,
focusing on the economics of the parcel as a whole, and viewing
the purpose of the regulation as prohibiting a nuisance. Con-
versely, if the decision is pro-landowner, the rationale generally
involves placing the burden of proof on the government to justify
interference with a constitutional right, focusing on that portion
of the property which is restricted or taken, and viewing the
purpose of a regulation as conferring a benefit upon the public.
The "technical" holding of Dolan is that in order to survive a
takings challenge, not only must a development exaction have
an essential nexus with a legitimate state interest, but also that
a rough proportionality must exist between the development
exaction and the burdens to be imposed by the proposed develop-
ment.'65 However, this case is seminal because of the underly-
ing assumptions in the Rehnquist opinion: that the focus of the
analysis is on the portion of the property affected by the regula-
tion as opposed to the parcel as a whole, and that the burden of
proof is on the state to demonstrate constitutionality.
The ideology of the Court in recent years has been moving
from pro-police power to pro-landowner, with Chief Justice
Rehnquist leading the way with his vigorous dissents in Penn
Central and Keystone. Beginning with Nollan in 1987, those
dissents have formed the basis for a line of pro-landowner ma-
jority opinions culminating in Dolan in 1994.1" Such opinions,
however, may have limited "technical" applicability. Nollan and
Dolan are both development exaction cases, and Lucas involves
the rare case in which the trial court found a total economic
loss.
Therefore, it is important to analyze these cases with a pro-
spective view, i.e., where does the Rehnquist Court go from here
with the regulatory takings issue? Justice Rehnquist may be
expected to retain his 5-4 Dolan majority in future regulatory
takings cases, if any, in the 1994-1995 Supreme Court Term.
The newest Supreme Court Justice, Stephen Breyer, is an un-
known factor in the equation, having heard only one reported
165. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317-20.
166. The takings ideology of the current majority is highlighted by recent dicta:
"[Tihe Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights
as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should [not be relegated to the
status of poor relation." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320. "We view the Fifth Amendment's
Property Clause to be more than a pleading requirement, and compliance with it to
be more than an exercise in cleverness and imagination." Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841.
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land use regulatory takings case in his entire career on the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.'67
One of the most important modern questions left without a
definitive answer by Supreme Court takings opinions to date is
how does takings affect federal wetlands regulation. Private
property owners may not develop lands classified by federal
rules as wetlands absent a permit from the Army Corps of Engi-
neers (the "Corps").' No Supreme Court decision to date has
directly addressed the question of the criteria for determining
when a permit denial by the Corps would be a taking.' A pro-
landowner decision in such a case could significantly curtail the
government's ability to engage in wetlands protection. The na-
tion would be forced to come to terms with the fact that if we as
a society value preservation of wetlands, then we as a society
must be willing to foot the bill.
Melody A. Hamel
167. See Adamowicz v. Town of Ipswich, 772 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1985) (per curi-
am). After receiving answers to certified questions from the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts interpreting state zoning law, the court of appeals agreed with the
district court's conclusion that the plaintiff was permitted to build and, therefore,
could not assert a federal taking claim since nothing had been taken. Adamowicz,
772 F.2d at 7.
168. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988 & Supp. 1994). See also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)
(1994) (defining wetlands).
169. The Court previously held that the broad scope of the Corps' wetlands
definition itself did not violate the Takings Clause. See United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126-27 (1985). The Court propounded that
whether a permit denial constituted a taking was a case specific question which
depended upon the landowner's ability to use the property after.the permit denial.
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 127 n.4. The Court did not address this ques-
tion as it applied to the developer in this case, because the appropriate vehicle for
making this determination was a compensation suit in the United States Claims
Court as opposed to a facial challenge to the statute in federal district court. Id. at
129 n.6.
A recent court of appeals decision directly addressing the question of when a
permit denial by the Corps effected a taking was Loveladies Harbor. See Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In this decidedly pro-
landowner decision, the appeals court agreed with the finding of the Claims Court
that the permit denial effectively deprived the landowner of all economically feasible
use of the 12.5 acres at issue. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1181-82. In making
this determination, the court focused on the regulated 12.5 acres, rejecting the
Government's contention that the developer's profit from the rest of its original 250
acre tract should be considered. Id. at 1180. Finding a total loss, the court then
addressed the Lucas question, and concluded that the Government had failed to
show that common law nuisance doctrine would have prohibited the filling of the
wetlands in this case. Id. at 1183.
